Introduction: Why Didn\u27t the Courts Stop the Mortgage Crisis? by Willis, Lauren E.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-2010
Introduction: Why Didn't the Courts Stop the
Mortgage Crisis?
Lauren E. Willis
This Developments in the Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University
and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lauren E. Willis, Introduction: Why Didn't the Courts Stop the Mortgage Crisis?, 43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1195 (2010).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol43/iss4/1
INTRODUCTION: WHY DIDN'T THE COURTS
STOP THE MORTGAGE CRISIS?
Lauren E. Willis*
The Great Recession of 2008, and 2009, and 2010, and who
knows how much longer, is upon us. Roughly 6.4 million home
foreclosures were initiated between 2007 and 2009,' and the Federal
Reserve Board predicts another 6.5 million for 2010 through 2012.2
This means that of the 76 million home-owning households that
existed at the start of this crisis, about one in six will have entered
foreclosure by the end.' In 2009, the homeownership rate declined to
about 67 percent, back to where it was in 2000,4 and will fall lower
as foreclosures continue.s Failures of those banks not bailed out by
the taxpayers are heading toward levels last seen in the savings and
loan crisis of 1986 to 1991.6 One hundred and forty banks failed in
Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles.
1. Lenders began foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties in 2007, 2.3
million in 2008, and 2.8 million in 2009. See RealtyTrac Year-End Report Shows Record 2.8
Million U.S. Properties with Foreclosure Filings in 2009, REALTYTRAC, Jan. 14, 2010,
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report/realtytrac-year-end-report-shows-
record-28-million-us-properties-with-foreclosure-filings-in-2009-5489.
2. Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
111th Cong. (2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/
duke20101118a.htm (testimony of Elizabeth A. Duke, Governor, Federal Reserve Board)
(predicting year-end numbers for 2010 and for 2011 to be 2.25 million and for 2012 to be 2
million).
3. At the start of the recession in 2007, there were about 75.6 million home-owning
households in the United States. U.S. CENSUS, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED
STATES: 2007, at 116 (2008).
4. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, REPORTS
ON RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES AND HOMEOWNERSHIP 4 tbl. 4 (2010), available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr409/files/q409press.pdf.
5. ANDREW HAUGHWOUT, RICHARD PEACH & JOSEPH TRACY, N.Y. FED. RESERVE BD.,
THE HOMEOWNERSHIP GAP, STAFF REPORT No. 418, at 7 (2009), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/sr418.pdf (calculating that due to negative
equity positions, the rate of nominal homeowners who actually own any equity in their homes is
between 3.7 and 11.9 points below the nominal homeownership rate, and predicting significant
declines in the nominal homeownership rate in the coming years due to this disparity).
6. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, I AN EXAMINATION OF THE
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2009,' and the projections are that between 500 and 750 lenders in
this country will fail by the time this recession is over.'
Unemployment now stands at 9.7 percent, meaning there are 15
million unemployed people looking for work-over 6 million of
whom have been unemployed for over six months.' Another 9
million people are working part time but seek full-time work, while
over 2 million people are no longer counted among the unemployed
because they have given up looking for a job."o
There has been no shortage of finger pointing about who caused
this crisis. "Greedy bankers . . . who basically spread the bad
mortgage virus throughout the global financial system-and got rich
doing so,"" may be the most often blamed. "[I]rresponsible
borrowers" are also a common target: "[b]uyers who took out a
mortgage they could never afford, buyers who tried to ride the
housing wave without educating themselves well enough, buyers
who committed fraud in hopes of netting a quick profit, and buyers
who attempted to flip more homes than they ever could manage."l2
Also charged are corrupt rating agencies, who "pimped themselves
out to the issuers, who paid them for their ratings,"l3 and the stupid
investors who blindly followed the ratings and "have learned utterly
nothing from the bubbles and collapses of the past decade." 4
Sleeping regulators, either in the "asleep at the switch" sense" or the
BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980s AND EARLY 1990s 168-69 (1997), available at http://
www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/167_188.pdf.
7. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Failures and Assistance Transactions,
http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30 (last visited July 7, 2010).
8. Eric Dash, Investors Ease Strain on F.D.I.C., N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2010, at BI (noting
that this figure is based on a total of 8100 banks).
9. Economic News Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation
Summary (July 2, 2010), http://www.b1s.gov/schedule/archives/empsit-nr.htm.
10. Id.
11. Deirdre McMurdy, Who's to Blame for the Financial Crisis?, MSN MONEY, Feb. 28,
2009, http://money.ca.msn.com/investing/deirdre-mcmurdy/article.aspx?cpdocumentid=
19417967.
12. Robert Holmes, Who's to Blame for the Economy? Homeowners, STREET, Mar. 11,
2009, http://www.thestreet.com/story/10470251/l/whos-to-blame-homeowners.html.
13. Dan Freed, Who's to Blame for the Economy? Rating Agencies, STREET, Mar. 13, 2009,
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10471826/l/whos-to-blame-rating-agencies.html.
14. John Hussman, Weekly Market Comment: Reckless Myopia, HUSSMAN FUNDS, Nov. 30,
2009, http://www.hussman.net/wmc/wmc091130.htm.
15. See, e.g., Tami Luhby, Bank Regulators: 'Asleep at the Switch,' CNNMONEY.COM, Mar.
4, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/04/news/companies/senatebank/index.htm (quoting
Senator Christopher Dodd: "'Again and again the question has been asked over the past year as
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sleeping with the banks sense,1 have also received a large share of
criticism. From Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 7 to China,'" the list of
those denounced as responsible for the crisis goes on.
But what about the courts? Where do the courts fit into all of
this? Thus far, our legal system has largely escaped any public blame
for the crisis. Which is curious, given that the legal system had a
ticket for a front-row seat to many of the causes of the crisis. The
mortgage boom and bust were riddled with violations of state and
federal law, from fraud to discrimination to Truth in Lending Act
(TILA)19 violations. Whether in bankruptcy cases, foreclosure
proceedings (which even in non-judicial states can be redirected into
judicial proceedings), or ordinary civil and criminal litigation, courts
could have, at least in theory, meted out justice to and deterred
wrongdoing by borrowers, appraisers, mortgage brokers, lenders,
investment banks, rating agencies, and investors.
So why didn't the courts stop the mortgage crisis, or at least
slow it down? The five articles in this issue of the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review are some of the first to address this question.
Part of the reason the courts failed to curb the crisis is the war on
class actions that has occurred in this country over the past two
decades.2 0 Congress participated in this through the Class Action
our credit markets have grown increasingly impaired: Where were the regulators? . . .Why didn't
they do more? Were they asleep at the switch? And when the alarm went off, did they merely hit
the snooze button?"').
16. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Jr., Regulatory Underkill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2008, at A13
(citing as one cause of the mortgage crisis that "federal regulators turned from impartial referees
to industry enablers"); Senator: Regulators Didn't Force WaMu to Fix Problems, USA TODAY,
Apr. 16, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/regulation/2010-04-16-wamu-
hearingN.htm (noting that Senator Carl Levin, "[dlecrying the cozy relationship between
regulators and bankers," stated that the federal Office of Thrift Supervision "'saw the shoddy
lending practices, saw the high-risk lending, saw the shoddy securitizations, understood the risk,
but let the bank do it anyway"'); see also Charles Riley, Reid Says Republicans 'Making Love to
Wall Street', CNNPOLITICS, May 5, 2010, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/05/05/reid-
republicans-make-love-to-wall-street/ (reporting that Senator Harry Reid accused Republicans of
"looking for a way to 'continue making love to Wall Street"').
17. See, e.g., Charles W. Calomiris & Peter J. Wallison, Blame Fannie Mae and Congress
for the Credit Mess, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2008, at A29.
18. See, e.g., Stephen Gandel, Did Foreigners Cause America's Financial Crisis?, TIME,
Jan. 15, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1954240,00.html.
19. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L, No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2006 & Supp. 112008).
20. See, e.g., Alistair B. Dawson & Geoff A. Gannaway, In Memoriam: Texas Class Actions,
ADVOCATE, Fall 2008, at 78; Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming Near-
Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005); Francisco Valdes,
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Fairness Act,2 1 but the campaign waged by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and other business interests against class-action
plaintiffs' lawyers22 has more broadly affected the way courts
approach class certification. As Jeffrey Payne's article, Class Retreat
from Mass Deceit: Assessing Class Action Compatibility with Truth
in Lending Act Rescission, details, the courts have cut off the class-
action device at its knees in the context of TILA violations.
Rescission is a primary remedy for TILA violations, carrying a three-
year statute of limitations, 2 3 rather than the one-year 24 limitations
period applicable to damages suits. During the mortgage boom of the
past decade, where lenders had committed repeated identical TILA
violations in originating home loans, private plaintiffs in numerous
cases sought declarations that all mortgages subject to the same
violation committed by the same lender could be rescinded at the
option of the borrowers. Nothing in the text of the statute restricts the
rescission remedy in class actions, yet the appellate courts interpreted
congressional silence to imply that a declaration of rescindability
may not be granted on a class-wide basis in TILA actions.25
Moreover, these courts did so despite evidence that Congress twice
considered and rejected the possibility of prohibiting TILA class-
action plaintiffs from seeking rescission. Congress amended TILA
once to limit the scope of the remedy in TILA class actions seeking
damages but not in TILA class actions seeking rescission. 26 Twenty
years later, knowing full well that plaintiffs in TILA class actions
frequently sought rescission,27 Congress chose to exempt lenders
Procedure, Policy and Power: Class Actions and Social Justice in Historical and Comparative
Perspective, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 627 (2008) (analyzing "holy war" on class actions).
21. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
22. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, CAFA's Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1593, 1596-1602 (2008) (explaining CAFA's origins in distrust of class-action plaintiffs'
lawyers).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).
24. Id § 1640(e).
25. Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570, 578 (7th Cir. 2008); McKenna v. First
Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 427 (1st Cir. 2007).
26. Act of October 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending § 1640(a)(2)(B)).
27. 141 CONG. REC. 26896 (1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato) (remarking on then recently
filed TILA class actions seeking rescission).
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from liability for small technical errors in TILA disclosures rather
than to restrict the availability of rescission in class actions.28
Even more appalling, at least in hindsight, is the policy rationale
these courts articulated: that because awarding the remedy of
allowing borrowers in a class action to rescind loans for TILA
violations might bankrupt lenders, the courts should not certify the
class. 29 That is, where lenders' violations of the law were detected,
the courts denied class-action certification specifically to allow those
lenders to continue to live-and lend-another day. This not only
ensured that problematic lenders would continue to originate
mortgages, but it encouraged other lenders to follow. Secure in the
knowledge that the courts would not put them out of business even if
they were caught disregarding their duties under TILA, other lenders
had a reduced incentive to comply with the law. Payne invites courts
to return to traditional rules of statutory interpretation and to allow
class actions seeking a declaration of mortgage rescindability for
TILA violations common to all class members to proceed.
A related reason the courts did not check the mortgage crisis is
explained in James Pulliam's article, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Market
Competitors, UDAP Consumer Protection Laws, and the U.S.
Mortgage Crisis. The history here parallels the war on class actions,
although the battlefield was limited to California. With a goal of
reducing consumer lawsuits, major corporations" waged a campaign
against California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL)." This
campaign culminated in the passage of Proposition 64, which
eliminated private attorney general standing under the UCL.
Traditionally in California, if one business saw a competitor
engaging in unfair or deceptive practices (turning back odometers on
used cars, for example), the honest business could sue the dishonest
business to prevent loss of market share due to the deceptive
28. Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, sec. 3, § 1605(f), 109
Stat. 271, 272-76.
29. McKenna, 475 F.3d at 426.
30. Evan Halper & Marc Lifsher, Initiative Seeks Curbs on Consumer Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES,
July 6, 2004, at Al (listing corporate donations to the campaign to pass Proposition 64); Marc
Lifsher, Prop. 64 Backers Fight for Attention, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at Cl (noting over $15
million was spent by backers of Proposition 64).
31. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (West 2008).
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practices.3 2 But after the passage of Proposition 64, only those
private plaintiffs who could demonstrate the direct loss of money or
property caused by an unfair business practice could sue.34 Honest
mortgage brokers, good appraisers, and responsible lenders all
effectively lost standing to sue to enjoin unfair competition.
In a competitive marketplace, this left businesses with little
financial choice but to join in the dishonest practices. For example, if
one lender were providing borrowers with lowball "good faith"
estimates under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, telling
borrowers their monthly payments would be much lower than the
lender knew those payments would really turn out to be, 6 other
lenders that did not engage in the same deception would lose
customers. After the passage of Proposition 64, the courts could no
longer assist competitors in maintaining an honest marketplace.
Pulliam suggests that competitor standing under California's UCL be
reinstated and that other states broaden their unfair or deceptive trade
practices statutes to allow suits by competitors.
Borrowers, lenders, or investors who suffered direct harm
retained standing to bring suit, but courts were unable to use their
power over fraud and unfair business practices claims to reach
another key factor underlying the mortgage meltdown-inflated
home appraisals. The enormous economic incentives for appraisers
to inflate home values simply swamped any deterrent effect of the
law. This mirrored the now better-known problem of rating agencies
awarding AAA bond ratings to mortgage-backed securities they
knew were quite risky. Moody's, Fitch, and Standard and Poor's
have all nearly admitted that their ratings were inflated, but they say
that the market forced them to do it; if they awarded honest ratings,
the Wall Street issuers paying for those ratings would have taken
32. Id. § 17204 (providing standing under the UCL to "any person acting for the interests of
itself, its members or the general public.").
33. California Proposition 64 is now codified as CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§17200-17500.
34. See id. § 17204.
35. Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (1974) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2617 (2006)).
36. See Kenneth R. Harney, Mortgage Lenders Can Sidestep New Rules to Prevent Lowball
Estimates, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2010 (discussing ways in which lenders circumvent new federal
rules designed to eliminate low-balled GFEs); see also Posting of Jeff Belonger to Active Rain,
http://activerain.com/blogsview/ 192459/good-faith-estimates-warnings-to-be-aware-of- (Aug.
12, 2009, 14:15 EST) (blog post of mortgage broker describing ways in which competing brokers
create inaccurate low-balled GFEs to lure away customers from honest brokers).
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their business to another rating agency." The same experience befell
appraisers. If they did not deliver the numbers that mortgage brokers,
loan officers, and borrowers wanted, they lost business." As in the
rating-agency situation, once lenders planned to sell off the
mortgages they originated into securities pools, no party to the
transaction had an incentive to ensure accurate appraisals.39
Therefore fraud, already a difficult claim to prove due to the inherent
subjectivity of the appraisal process, could only be pursued post hoc.
Moreover, just a few bad appraisers can spoil the pot. Once one or
two house prices in a neighborhood are inflated, the new
"comparables" that determine neighboring property values4 0 will
drive up all appraised values.
In Issues in Appraisal Regulation: The Cracks in the Foundation
of the Mortgage Lending Process, J. Kevin Murray proposes that we
revive an old solution to this problem. Murray suggests reintroducing
the system formerly used by the Federal Housing Administration
37. See Blake Ellis, How Credit Watchdogs Fueled the Financial Crisis, CNNMONEY.COM,
Apr. 24, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/23/news/economy/credit rating agencies
hearing/index.htm (reporting that executives from Standard and Poor's and Moody's
acknowledged that "investment banks shop around for the best rating" and that a former vice
president at Moody's admitted in testimony that "he felt constant pressure to accept deals, even if
they looked risky"); Kevin G. Hall & Chris Adams, Senate Panel: Ratings Agencies Rolled Over
for Wall Street, MCCLATCHY NEWS, Apr. 22, 2010, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/04/22/
92709/senate-panel-ratings-agencies.html (reporting on "e-mail records in which executives from
Standard & Poor's and Moody's Investors Service acknowledge compromising the integrity of
ratings to win business from big Wall Street firms").
38. In a 2007 survey, 90 percent of home appraisers said that they were pressured to inflate
their appraisal numbers. OCTOBER RESEARCH CORPORATION, 2007 NATIONAL APPRAISER
SURVEY: EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW 3 (2007), available at http://www.appraisalinstitute.org/
newsadvocacy/downloads/ltrststmny/2007/Ntnl ApprslSrvy.pdf, see also Legislative Solutions
to Abusive Mortgage Lending Practices: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and
Community Opportunity and the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the
H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 109th Cong. 199 (2005) (testimony of Alan E. Hummel, Chief
Executive Officer, Iowa Residential Appraisal Company) (citing a 2003 survey of appraisers by
an independent research organization showing that 55 percent of appraisers felt pressure to
overstate their appraisals). Eleven thousand appraisers signed a petition asking state and federal
agencies to do something to stop this pressure. See AppraisersPetition.com, Petition by Real
Estate Appraisers to Stop Unfair Practices, http://appraiserspetition.com/ (last visited July 9,
2010).
39. See DAVID CALLAHAN, DEMOS, HOME INSECURITY-HOW WIDESPREAD APPRAISAL
FRAUD PUTS HOMEOWNERS AT RISK 1-3 (2005), available at http://www.cheatingculture.com/
home insecurity v3.pdf (describing how lenders and consumers both encourage or at least
acquiesce in appraisal fraud).
40. For a description of the appraisal process and use of recently sold comparable properties
to establish values, see UNIF. STANDARDS OF PROF'L APPRAISAL PRACTICE R. 1-1 to 4-2
(Appraisal Standards Bd. 2010).
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mortgage-insurance program: the random assignment of appraisers to
properties. 41 A federal agency would keep a list of qualified
appraisers, coded for neighborhood and property-type expertise.
When parties to a home mortgage need an appraisal, they would
submit their request, along with their neighborhood and property
type, to the agency to receive a randomly assigned appraiser.
Appraisers with poor track records would be disqualified from the
list. With no broker, loan officer, or borrower able to control whether
an appraiser is hired again for future transactions, appraisers would
no longer face financial pressure to inflate values and would be free
to act as impartial experts.
Why else did the courts fail to curtail the mortgage crisis? As
Andrew Lichtenstein's United We Stand, Disparate We Fall: Putting
Individual Victims of Reverse Redlining in Touch with Their Class
elucidates, discrimination in mortgage lending had changed
dramatically in the years leading up to the crash, and borrowers, their
lawyers, and the courts failed to recognize the new shape of
discrimination. Prior to the 1990s, lending discrimination consisted
of denying loans to qualified minority applicants or applicants from
minority neighborhoods, a practice known as redlining. When
subprime lending took hold, lenders started targeting minorities for
expensive and complex loan products-products that often led to
foreclosure. But courts, lawyers, and even borrowers did not perceive
this mutation from redlining to reverse redlining. 42 Because they
equated discrimination with mortgage denial, they often failed to
perceive the injury of being targeted, based on race or ethnicity, for a
loan that was overpriced, overly risky, and just plain inappropriate
for the borrower's financial situation.
Further, proof in reverse-redlining claims, whether brought
under the Fair Housing Act43 (FHA) or the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act" (ECOA), typically relies on statistical data regarding the
41. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-97-176, HOMEOWNERSHIP:
INFORMATION ON CHANGES IN FHA's NEW SINGLE-FAMILY APPRAISAL PROCESS 2 (1997).
42. See Gregory D. Squires, The New Redlining, in WHY THE POOR PAY MORE: HOW TO
STOP PREDATORY LENDING 2-3 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 2004) (explaining move from redlining
to reverse redlining).
43. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619
(2006)).




lender's disparate lending practices toward white and nonwhite
applicants.45 This information is beyond the ken of the borrower
relating his or her story to an attorney. Even if a borrower senses that
she might have been a victim of disparate treatment, proving such a
claim calls for statistical analyses of the lender's loan portfolio-
analyses that require time and resources beyond what a typical
bankruptcy attorney can devote to the case of a borrower who is
about to lose her home to foreclosure. Lichtenstein recommends that
the primary responsibility in this area should be moved from private
plaintiffs to government agencies that are better able to track lender
activities, perceive statistical patterns in loan origination data, and
pursue reverse-redlining claims on behalf of victims of this new form
of discrimination.
Finally, one reason the courts are not helping us get out of this
crisis, despite their power to halt some of the foreclosures that result
in over 3,000 lost homes each day in this country,4 6 is that most
courts rubber-stamp foreclosures. As Andrew Kazakes expounds in
Protecting Absent Stakeholders in Foreclosure Litigation: The
Foreclosure Crisis, Mortgage Modification, and State Court
Responses, in foreclosure actions the courts usually see, at most, only
two of the parties affected: the servicer and the homeowner. In non-
judicial foreclosure, the process can occur without any court
involvement, although the homeowner can bring the matter to the
attention of a state judge through a motion for preliminary
injunction4 7 or of a federal judge by filing for bankruptcy.48 The
servicer does not own the loan and has little interest in long-term
loan performance.49 The borrower, if she shows up at all, usually is
unable to prove any defenses to foreclosure that she has, or has
45. Stephen L. Ross & John Yinger, Uncovering Discrimination: A Comparison of the
Methods Used by Scholars and Civil Rights Enforcement Officials, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 562,
571-85 (2006) (explaining proof required in disparate impact lawsuits).
46. Lenders took back a record 92,432 properties in April 2010 alone. Lynn Adler, April
Foreclosures Ebb, Suggesting High Plateau, REUTERS.COM, May 13, 2010, http://www.reuters.
com/ article/idUSTRE64COCB20100513?type=domesticNews.
47. See JOHN RAO ET AL., NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSURES § 4.2.3, at 76
(2007).
48. Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and Homeownership Risk, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
323, 327-28 (2007).
49. Larry Cordell et al., The Incentives of Mortgage Servicers: Myths and Realities 18 (Fed.
Reserve Bd., Finance & Economics Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2008-46, 2008).
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none."o But there is another party with an interest in this mortgage-
the investors who ultimately own the loan, through the securitization
conduit. Kazakes presents evidence that in a substantial number of
cases, these investors would be better off if the mortgage were
modified to reduce monthly payments to a manageable level for the
borrower rather than foreclosed upon."' That is, the net present value
to the investors of a foreclosure is lower than the net present value of
a loan modification. Yet in most foreclosure cases, judges are blind
to the interests of these investors.
So what are the courts to do about this situation, given that only
the borrower and the servicer are parties to the action? In other
contexts, when conducting legal proceedings in which persons not
before the court have a legally cognizable interest, the courts
recognize a duty to protect those absent stakeholders. For example,
judges safeguard the personal and financial welfare of unnamed class
members in class-action settlements,5 2 parties not present in ex parte
actions," unborn beneficiaries in matters involving trusts and
estates,54 and minors and incompetent persons who may be affected
by litigation." Kazakes suggests that judges apply this same "absent
stakeholder doctrine" to protect the interests of investors in
50. See MELANCA CLARK, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FORECLOSURES: A CRISIS IN
LEGAL REPRESENTATION 2, 4 (2009).
51. See also Cordell et al., supra note 49, at 12-13.
52. See, e.g., 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1864, Role and Discretion of Court (2010)
("[T]he district court acts as a fiduciary and as a guardian of the rights of the absent class
members." (footnote omitted)); 59 AM JUR. 2D Parties § 92, Class Actions or Suits-Practice and
Procedure: In General (2010) ("To protect the rights of absent parties, a court takes on a
heightened role throughout class action litigation .... ).
53. Adobe Sys., Inc. v. S. Sun Prods., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 636, 639 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
("Restraining order applications sought ex parte require the court to serve as the absent party's
advocate, triggering intense judicial scrutiny of a plaintiffs claims, the relief it seeks, and most
importantly, its proffered justification for proceeding ex parte.").
54. See, e.g., Family Settlement of Testator's Estate, 29 A.L.R.3d 8, § 2a (2009) ("When the
court . . . finds that [a proposed settlement of an estate] will best serve the interests of the minors
and unborn or unknown beneficiaries, it may approve the contract and order that it be carried
out."); A.W. SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT & ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 12.1.1 (5th ed. 2008) (noting that
where a trust beneficiary is unborn, "even before the child's birth or conception, a contingent
beneficial interest exists, and . .. the courts will protect it").
55. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 17(c)(2) ("The court must appoint a guardian ad litem-or issue
another appropriate order-to protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an
action."); 7 TEX. JUR. 3D Attorneys at Law § 133, Duties of Appointed Counsel (2010) ("An
attorney appointed or assigned to represent an indigent or other person has a duty to act and to
diligently protect all the rights of that person.... If the court-appointed attorney fails to discharge
his or her obligation, it becomes the duty of the trial judge to take the initiative and to interpose
the court's authority to protect the absent parties from injustice.").
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foreclosure proceedings. Courts would condition foreclosure on
proof by the servicer that foreclosure is in the best interests of
investors.
In sum, all five articles shed much-needed light on why the
courts failed to stop the mortgage crisis, lessons we in the legal
profession need to take seriously if we want the law to function for
the greater social good. The proposals here are modest and narrowly
targeted:
* authorize certification of class actions pursuing
rescission as a potential remedy under TILA;
* allow businesses to sue under California and other
states' unfair competition laws to stop their
competitors from using unfair and deceptive
practices to steal market share;
* return to the old FHA insurance program's model
for random assignment of qualified appraisers for
home mortgage purposes;
* beef up government enforcement of the FHA and
ECOA; and
* recognize the interests of absent investor
stakeholders in foreclosure litigation and refuse to
allow a foreclosure to take place when a loan
modification would best serve those interests.
Perhaps if these changes had been made in the law earlier, they
would have had only a small effect at the margins of the crisis. But
that would be something. When fraud, discrimination, and other
violations of the law are implicated in a national crisis, the law
should not be a mere bystander.
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